The paper investigates the impact of the imposition of a minimum buyback requirement on open market repurchases (OMRs) in India. We extend the signaling model of Oded (2005) by including a minimum buyback requirement and show that it increases the stock price during the repurchase period, relative to a no minimum buyback regime. Accordingly, we find that the regulatory change has led to a significant increase in the abnormal stock returns earned around buyback announcements. Also, insiders increase their purchase of firms’ stock during the buyback execution period relative to the pre-reform period. These findings are consistent with a higher information value of OMR announcements in the minimum buyback regime. We further observe lower market timing through buyback execution, accompanied by a change in the execution-style, implying a weaker instinct for opportunistic buybacks. Our findings suggest that the regulatory change has lowered the “cheap-talk” motives associated with the announcement of open market buybacks.