Why do some firms voluntarily exceed legally mandated requirements for corporate social responsibility (CSR)? We examine this question in the context of India, an emerging economy where the Companies Act of 2013 mandates eligible firms to spend 2% of profits on CSR. This institutional setting provides a clear benchmark for identifying firms’ CSR overspending, voluntary spending beyond the mandated threshold, as a substantive form of CSR engagement rather than compliance. Drawing on agency and stakeholder theories, we argue that family ownership influences CSR overspending through specific governance mechanisms: (a) overlapping membership between CSR and stakeholder relations committees and (b) female representation on the CSR committee. From an agency perspective, family owners pursue non-economic objectives such as preserving the family’s legacy and reputation. From a stakeholder perspective, they are particularly attentive to maintaining societal legitimacy. We propose that as family ownership increases, CSR governance becomes less oriented toward CSR spending compliance and more toward stakeholder preferences, leading to CSR overspending. Using panel data from 601 publicly listed Indian firms (2015–2024), we find robust empirical support for our research model. Our findings suggest that in a context where family ownership is widespread, CSR overspending represents a strategic choice shaped by family owners’ preferences and channeled through CSR governance mechanisms. This study contributes to research on family-firm ethics and CSR governance in emerging economies by clarifying how ownership and CSR committee composition influence CSR spending beyond compliance.