Prof. Jeevant Rampal
Auctions are often used to sell property rights for liquor licenses, spectrum licenses, land and mineral rights, and construction projects etc. This project investigates potential improvements in these auctions using a computational data-driven approach. The first part of this project will be to collect primary data of the participants and their choices in auctions. Subsequently, using the game-theoretic properties of the chosen auction design, we will computationally estimate the true (unobservable) value distribution across players of the object(s) being auctioned (e.g., liquor licenses). The estimation method used will be non-parametric “distance minimization” between the observed out-of-sample distribution of bids, and the predicted out-of-sample distribution of bids using optimally calibrated parameter values. E.g., Athey, Levin, and Seira (QJE 2011) use their estimated model to make comparative static predictions and test that for fit against data from timber auctions.
Finally, to analyse which auction design would have best met the various aims of the auction designer, we will use the calibrated model, parameters, and the estimated valuations of the bidders. In particular, using these we will simulate the revenue, efficiency, and other metrics of importance for different auction designs. In addition to the use of simulation described above, to analyse alternate auction designs, we will use simulations of variations of the estimated model, parameters (like risk aversion, budgets etc.), and value distributions to analyse the different rates with which different auction designs can meet the various possible aims of the auction designer.