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Education and Employment among Muslims in India - An Analysis of Patterns and Trends

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Abstract

After the submission of the Sachar Committee Report, several studies have undertaken data-based analysis of the socioeconomic and educational conditions of Muslims in India. Many researchers, policy makers and, in fact, common Muslims believe that education can be the only mechanism to enhance their socioeconomic status and facilitate entry into better paid jobs. At the same time there are concerns about access to educational facilities and possible discrimination in the formal labour market. The paper reviews the available evidence on the patterns of Muslim participation in education and employment. Comparing the estimates derived from the most recent round of the National Sample Survey for the year 2009-2010 with the earlier years (1999-2000 and 2004-05), an effort is made to assess if these patterns have changed in recent years. A preliminary analysis of the correlates of these patterns suggests that these are quite complex and multi-dimensional. Perceptions about discrimination interact with endowments, opportunities, supply side conditions and attitudes to give rise to different patterns of participation in employment and education. A different set of policy actions may be required to ameliorate these conditions.

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1. Introduction

Sachar Committee report was probably the first attempt to analyse the conditions of the Muslim community using large-scale empirical data. It clearly brought out the relative deprivation of Muslims in India in various dimensions including employment and education. The Sachar report highlighted the heterogeneity within the Community as well as the multi-dimensionality of issues that it faces. Broadly, the multiple dimensions of the issues get reflected in two inter-related ways. One, like other minorities, Muslims *simultaneously* face, problems relating to security, identity and equity. And the interplay of these dimensions is at the core of the socio-economic and political processes that the Community is exposed to on a daily basis. Two, the nature of these problems vary across 'spaces' – education, employment, political and social – and probably over time. Conceptually, participation in one 'space' can be seen to be linked with participation in another 'space'. For example, participation in education can influence participation in employment and vice versa. But, an empirical exploration of these multidimensional issues and inter-linkages between participation in different spaces is typically hampered by the non-availability of relevant 'hard and unbiased' data.

The other perspective that the Sachar Report explicitly brought into the academic debate was that the problems faced by Muslims are a *combination* of those faced by the *poor* (as a large proportion of Muslims are poor), by *all minorities* and *exclusively by Muslims*. This perspective adds to the multidimensionality of the issues faced by Muslims and also highlights the

need to have a comparative perspective when analyzing the conditions of Muslims.

Ideally, a nuanced understanding of the multi-dimensional reality should inform policy not only for the Muslim community but all marginalized groups. Unfortunately, that is not the case partly because analyses to provide such an understanding are difficult² and partly due to the fact that nuanced policy initiatives are often politically infeasible. For example, affirmative action, especially in the form of reservation policies, to address the issues of inclusion and equity has been in place in India for a long time. Through these policies higher participation of the marginalized groups is sought in the political, educational and work related domains. Over the years the scope and coverage of these reservation policies has been enlarged through the inclusion of new social groups and by incorporating new 'spaces' hitherto not available to certain social groups. For example, while reservation in both educational and work related domains has been available for scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) persons, the higher education space has been incorporated for the other backward classes (OBCs) only recently. Similarly, while reservation in the employment domain was introduced for SCs and STs fairly early, OBCs were included at a much later stage. Over the years, several castes and communities have been added to the reserved lists of each category at the Central and state levels. But policy makers have not found it useful to analyze the role of affirmative action in different domains *together*, so that the linkages across key domains of affirmative action can be explored.

A variety of factors have been identified to explain the observed relative deprivation among Muslims in India. These include differentials in endowments across social groups, actual or perceived discrimination, behaviour patterns or attitudes and supply of educational and employment opportunities. This paper

² As an underlying process, higher participation of specific segments of population in one domain (e.g., politics) may influence participation in other domains. However, capturing the dynamics of these linkages empirically is difficult as participation in different domains may interact in myriad ways over a period of time.

reviews the available literature and empirical evidence to explore, in a comparative perspective, the role of these factors in explaining the patterns and recent trends in participation of Muslims in the areas of education and employment. And, on the basis of this exploration raises some policy related questions. While some fresh data analysis is done for this purpose, the bulk of the exploration is undertaken by pooling together interesting insights from recent studies on the subject. The review suggests that the correlates of Muslim participation in education and employment are complex and multi-dimensional. Perceptions about discrimination interact with endowments, opportunities, supply side conditions and attitudes to give rise to different patterns of participation in employment and education. A different set of policy actions may be required to ameliorate these conditions.

The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 briefly discusses the data and the socio-religious categories (SRCs) that can be defined on the basis of these data and that are useful for comparative purposes. Section 3 draws some insights on the perceptions of the Muslim community regarding their participation in different 'spaces'. This provides a context to the subsequent analysis of trends and patterns of Muslims' participation in employment and education spaces. Evidence on the participation in education is discussed in Section 4 in the light of recent literature on the subject. Section 5 undertakes a similar exercise in the context of employment patterns. The final section concludes and highlights some policy issues.

2. Data Sources and Defining Socio-religious Categories

A variety of data sources have been used to analyze the conditions of Muslims in India. The challenge is to not only capture the heterogeneity within the Community but also define categories of other groups to make meaningful comparisons. In this paper we have used the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data. More specifically, we have used data from the three

Employment-Unemployment rounds of the NSSO – 55th (1999-2000), 61st (2004-05) and 66th (2009-10). These are the largest sample surveys in India that provide information on the caste and religion of the respondents along with information on education and employment characteristics.

In the Indian context, economic conditions along with community and caste affiliations present themselves as appropriate variables that should go into defining these groups. Consequently, taking a lead from the Sachar Committee, socio-religious communities (SRCs) within both Muslim and non-Muslim population are sought to be defined in a fairly disaggregated manner. Using the National Sample Survey (NSS) data separate categories have been defined. These disaggregate *Hindus* into:

- Hindu, upper castes - Hindu (UC);
- Hindu, Other Backward Classes – Hindu (OBCs);
- Hindu, Scheduled Castes – Hindu (SC); and
- Hindu, Scheduled Tribes – Hindu (ST).

Muslims are divided into general and OBC (including those Muslims that report their ‘caste’ as SC) groups:

- Muslim, General – Muslim (Gen); and
- Muslim, OBC – Muslim (OBC).

Other minorities (OM) have been retained as a separate category.

Admittedly, the internal differentiation (heterogeneity) among the Hindu and Muslim communities is much more than what these categories can capture. However, given the paucity of data, these provide the best option and have both a sociological basis (see Chapter 10 of Sachar Committee Report) and historical relevance (Saberwal, 2010).

Explicit recognition of the heterogeneity among the communities is not only useful for the purposes of understanding the relative deprivation of the Muslim community through appropriate comparisons; it also provides insights into the emerging dynamics of political processes in the Indian society. Political parties have been increasingly exploiting this internal differentiation for political mobilization. Since political participation can potentially impinge on security, identity and equity, an understanding of such processes is critical.

3. Community's Perceptions on Its Participation in Different 'Spaces'

In the absence of 'hard-unbiased' data, one way of exploring the complex links between equity, identity and security related issues is to look at them through the lens of public perceptions. Based on extensive interactions with Muslims, it has been argued³ that Muslims carry a double burden of being labeled as "anti-nationalists" and being appeased at the same time.⁴ The fact that the so-called appeasement has not resulted in any benefits is typically ignored. Identity markers often lead to suspicion and discrimination by people and institutions. Discrimination too is pervasive in employment, housing and education. Gender injustice is usually identified purely with personal law to the exclusion of gender-related concerns in education and employment that Muslim women do face on a continuing basis.⁵ The public focus on personal law and other socio-cultural characteristics of the community also has another negative externality; the cause of backwardness in all spheres is assigned to the community itself. Moreover, the feeling of insecurity among Muslims is high, especially in communally sensitive states and among women. The discriminatory attitude of the police and others compounds this feeling; ghettoization is a result of insecurity and discrimination in housing, schools and jobs. Insecurity

³ For details see Chapter 2 of the Sachar Committee Report. The first few paragraphs in this section draw heavily from Basant and Shariff (2010).

⁴ This double burden seems to be specific to the Muslim community, not experienced by other socio-religious groups.

⁵ Hasan and Menon (2004) also argue that inequities in Muslim personal law are given disproportionate emphasis while ascribing 'low status' to Muslim women.

adversely affects mobility, especially of women, leading to situations wherein Muslims are not able to fully exploit economic opportunities. The widespread perception of discrimination among Muslims results in a sense of alienation and is therefore seen by the Community as an important cause of inequity. Limited access to good quality schools is a major problem that affects female students more adversely. Discrimination and “communalization” of reading material and school atmosphere adds to this problem. Consequently, Madarasas, at times, are the only source of education in the neighbourhood.

Apart from education, employment is the other major concern. Low participation in government jobs is partly seen as a result of discrimination. The employment situation has deteriorated because globalization and liberalization processes appear to have affected Muslim occupations (mainly self-employment) more adversely than others, especially for women. This, coupled with low bargaining power of workers (especially home-based), results in low incomes. Non-availability of credit curtails the ability of the community to improve their economic status; Muslim concentration areas are designated as “red zones” where credit flows are virtually non-existent. Discrimination in the implementation of government programmes and in infrastructure provision adds to the problems in the economic sphere.

This discrimination in various economic areas coexists with low political participation. Here again discrimination is seen in the non-inclusion of Muslims in the voter lists and the unfair delimitation exercises wherein Muslim majority constituencies are reserved for the SC category, even when the latter have higher population shares in other constituencies in the states. Consequently, Muslim candidates are not able to contest from Muslim concentrated areas.

The Muslim community's perceptions summarized above highlight a process wherein identity based discrimination reduces access, enhances inequity and adds to insecurity. Security problems also reduce access to schools, housing, infrastructure etc. (especially for women), which in turn contribute to inequities.

While it is difficult to get concrete data on the perceptions of specific population groups about the security, identity and equity issues, one promising line of work is to develop social-psychological measures of perceptions of fairness and self-esteem. Such work is in its infancy in India and has used relatively small sample sizes for empirical investigations, but provides some very interesting insights. Singh et al (2010) collected data from Hindu, Muslim and Christian respondents to estimate 'perceived fairness scores' across different areas of opportunity - social, economic, employment, education and political - different spaces that we referred to earlier. Table 1 reports the mean scores along with the information on the significance of difference in these perception scores. A few features stand out:

- Perceived fairness of Hindu participants is higher than of others in all the five areas followed by Christians and Muslims;
- The area of education is the only area where Christian participants have higher scores (although not statistically different from Hindus) while Muslims have much lower scores;
- In the political space, both Muslims and Christians perceive lower fairness as compared to Hindus;
- In the remaining three areas (employment, economic and social) the three groups differ significantly from each other, with Hindus reporting highest level fairness in opportunities followed by Christians and Muslims. Muslims report scores that are much lower than the other two groups for economic and employment opportunities.

Another noteworthy finding of the study by Singh et al (2010) was that there was no significant difference in the perceptions in terms of gender and employment status (employed vs. unemployed) among the three religious groups. The study also explored caste differences (lower vs. upper caste) in the perception scores in the three religious groups in the five opportunity areas. Interestingly, amongst the Hindus caste differences were significant in all the areas with lower castes reporting higher perceived fairness. However, there was no significant difference in perceptions in terms of caste for Muslims and Christians.⁶

Opportunities	Hindu	Muslim	Christian	F
Social Prestige	10.20 ^a	8.48 ^b	8.72 ^c	4.58**
Economic	11.92 ^a	9.04 ^b	10.24 ^c	20.11**
Educational	11.32 ^a	8.12 ^b	11.36 ^a	34.16**
Employment	10.92 ^a	8.60 ^b	9.48 ^c	18.40**
Political	12.24 ^a	8.08 ^b	8.00 ^b	56.13**

Source: Singh et al (2010): 129.

4. Common superscripts show no significant difference.

Score range is 4 (very low) to 20 (very high). Mean scores reported here. Higher scores indicate higher perceptions of fairness of opportunities.

Overall, therefore the perceptions of fairness are the lowest among the Muslims. And given the fact that employment status and gender do not make any difference to the perception scores, religion clearly is the most important differentiating factor as far as perceptions are concerned. Unlike the other two religious groups, participants from the Muslim community had negative perceptions about the future possibilities of exploiting new opportunities in the five areas by members of the Community. Of course, among Hindus, caste does make a difference but here the upper castes feel discriminated against, presumably due to the policy of reservation in employment, education and political spaces.

⁶ It needs to be noted that the estimates of perceived fairness do not control for income categories and therefore we do not get any insights about the interaction between caste, religion, gender, employment and economic status in influencing perception scores.

4. Patterns and Correlates of Participation in Education⁷

The Sachar Committee report brought out very sharply the relative deprivation of Muslims in the field of education. Table 2 provides summary information on the distribution of population (17-29 years) by educational attainment for each SRC for the period 1999-2010. Literacy rates among Muslims are lower than most other SRCs (except for SCs and STs) and have not increased fast enough to converge with literacy rates of high caste groups. Literacy rates are the lowest for Hindu-ST (and also low for Hindu-SC) but have increased significantly in recent years. Among Muslims, the decline in illiteracy rates was more dramatic for Muslim-General (37 to 19 per cent) than for Muslim-OBCs (34 to 26 per cent) during the decade of 1999-2010. More detailed estimates on literacy rates among different SRCs reported in Appendix Tables 1a to 1d bring out some interesting patterns:

- As expected, literacy rates are much lower in rural areas as compared to urban areas but both for males and females, the rates have improved in the last decade, especially after 2004-05. Also, the patterns and trends are more or less the same as the aggregate trends described above, except that literacy rates have not improved very significantly for rural women belonging to Muslim-OBC households;
- In urban areas the rates of literacy are higher but the improvements have not been that dramatic. Moreover, while for urban females belonging to the Muslim community (both OBC and general) show the same pattern as the one described above, Muslim men living in urban areas are worse-off than all other SRCs, Muslim OBCs reporting the lowest literacy rates.

These trends are consistent with the Sachar Committee findings that school enrolment rates were among the lowest for Muslims but had *improved* in recent years. This is also consistent with the perception that the Community is

⁷ This subsection draws from Basant and Shariff (2010) and supplements the analysis with some more recent data.

increasingly looking at education as a means of improving socio-economic status.

Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Persons by Education for Each Socio-religious Category (SRC), (Rural + Urban and Male + Female), 17-29 years									
<i>Year/ Education</i>	<i>Hindu -UC</i>	<i>Hindu- OBC</i>	<i>Hindu -SC</i>	<i>Hindu- ST</i>	<i>Muslim- OBC</i>	<i>Muslim- General</i>	<i>Muslim- All</i>	<i>Other Minorities</i>	<i>All</i>
1999-00									
Not literate	13.4	33.7	42.9	53.1	33.7	36.9	36.0	18.8	30.9
Secondary & below	58.7	54.7	49.5	39.6	59.0	54.0	55.5	58.7	54.0
Higher secondary	15.9	8.0	5.3	5.8	5.3	6.0	5.8	14.6	9.5
Graduate & above	12.0	3.6	2.3	1.5	2.1	3.1	2.7	8.0	5.5
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2004-05									
Not literate	9.6	25.2	33.9	45.6	32.8	27.3	29.3	14.2	24.8
Secondary & below	57.1	59.9	56.4	47.5	58.8	62.1	60.7	61.1	57.9
Higher secondary	18.6	9.7	6.6	5.2	5.8	6.6	6.4	15.2	10.6
Graduate & above	14.7	5.2	3.0	1.8	2.6	4.0	3.6	9.5	6.7
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2009-10									
Not literate	5.7	16.2	24.7	30.1	26.1	18.8	22.3	8.8	17.1
Secondary & below	51.2	59.3	60.8	58.0	59.0	67.7	63.8	56.2	58.2
Higher secondary	24.0	16.1	10.0	8.6	10.2	9.7	9.8	22.1	15.5
Graduate & above	19.2	8.5	4.5	3.3	4.8	3.8	4.1	13.0	9.2
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs

Dropout rates are also among the highest for Muslims and this seems to go up significantly after middle school (Table 2). Higher secondary attainment levels are also among the lowest for Muslims and in relative terms, inter-SRC differences rise at the school leaving stage. This contributes to large deficits in higher education; graduate attainment rates (GARs) are also among the lowest and not converging with the average. The major problem appears to lie at the

school level; once that hurdle of eligibility is crossed, differences in GARs across SRCs narrow down substantially and are often not very different (see discussion below). As with other areas of education, participation of Muslims in technical and engineering education is also among the lowest (data not reported here).

In terms of crossing the school threshold and graduate attainment rates, the rural-urban differences are interesting as far as Muslims are concerned. (See Appendix Tables 1a to 1d). The condition of Muslims is particularly bad in urban areas while in rural areas they more or less seem to be on par with Hindu-STs and in some cases Hindu-SCs which have the lowest educational attainments among all groups. In urban areas, Muslims clearly constitute the lowest rung in terms of educational attainment of passing school or going to college.

What explains these low educational achievements of Muslims, especially in urban India? It has been argued that it could both be due to supply and demand side issues and several studies have explored these dimensions. In what follows we try and summarize key insights.

The Sachar Committee suggested that the availability of Urdu schools is very limited. Such schools are important for the community in Urdu-speaking areas, especially at the primary level where education in the mother tongue is generally preferred. Madrasas are an important community initiative but their reach is very limited; less than 4 per cent school-going Muslim children go to madrasas. Consequently, mainstream schools are the only means to satisfy increasing demand for education in the Community. And the supply of such schools in the vicinity of Muslims habitats may be one of the reasons for lower educational attainments.

Bhalotra and Zamora (2010) utilize sources of data not used by the Sachar Committee to provide evidence of low Growth in School Enrollment and Completion Rates amongst Muslims in India, which is in line with the evidence compiled in the Sachar report and also reported above. Exploring the extent to which enrolment and completion rates have grown over time, they find that while enrolment rates among Muslims have gone up, drop-out rates have not declined as much. Can the differences between religions be explained by endowments, location and attitudes? The paper decomposes growth in enrolment and completion rates into a component that captures the effect of *changes in the characteristics that determine schooling*, and another that is associated with *changes in the responsiveness of schooling to given characteristics*. It is found that two similarly endowed households (in terms of wealth, educational attainment, household size and composition), one Hindu and one Muslim, would come out with different educational gaps depending on which state they were located in, highlighting once again the importance of regional characteristics in deciding human development outcomes. But behavioural features are also found to be important because two similarly endowed households in the same state, one Hindu and one Muslim, have different enrolment rates with the latter having lower rates. This suggests that the same characteristics seem to influence enrolment choices differently across religions.

The importance of the so-called behavioural aspects in explaining inter-religious differences in the participation in education gets further highlighted when the authors compare educational shortfalls of Muslims and low caste children relative to high caste children. While the shortfall among low caste children could be explained by the disadvantages these children have in terms of the characteristics that positively influence schooling (e.g., their being poorer), this was not the case for Muslims. In other words, even with more positive characteristics than low caste children, Muslims either have less

positive attitude towards education or their opportunities to attend school are poorer. The authors argue that their results are consistent with discrimination against Muslims but may also reflect that the Community is faced with poorer quality (or less suitable schools)⁸ or has less appreciation of the rewards of education.⁹ The rewards of education are linked to the prospects of employment and it has been argued that better employment potential may enhance participation in education. Moreover, the supply side variables (i.e., easy access and availability of educational institutions) can influence participation of Muslims in education in a significant manner.

Some earlier work by this author has undertaken a detailed empirical exploration of *participation of marginalized groups in higher education* in India.¹⁰ In one of these studies we (Basant and Sen, 2010) have argued that measures of participation in higher education need to be more nuanced than what have been used in recent years. The first distinction that needs to be made is between *attainment* and *enrollment*. While the former captures the segment that has *completed* graduate and higher level of education, the latter focuses on the segment that is *currently studying* for graduation or higher courses. In addition, while attainment is a *stock* measure and carries the 'burden of history', enrollment is a *flow* measure that captures the current situation and provides indications for the future. Three measures have been recommended for any population segment (see Table 3):¹¹

⁸ Good data on the availability of schools across SRCs is difficult to get. The Sachar Committee found that broadly, the availability of schools and P&T facilities is relatively less in *small* villages with a high density of Muslim population and the availability of bus, road and medical facilities is relatively less in *larger* villages with high Muslim concentration.

⁹ Hussain (2005) uses data from Kolkata to show that perceived returns to education are low for Muslims and given the low quality of education in the vicinity, the reliance on private coaching is high. Basant and Sen (2010) also show that as compared to other SRCs, Muslims rely more on private sector educational institutions.

¹⁰ See Basant and Sen (2010); (2012); (2011).

¹¹ For all these measures, if one compares a group's share in the population of the relevant age group with its share in the number of graduates (or studying population), one can compute 'deficits'. Broadly, if the population share is higher than the share in graduates, the group suffers from a 'deficit' in terms of participation.

1. Share of graduates and higher degree holders in the population group above 20 years of age, which characterizes an *All Generations' Stock (henceforth, AGS) measure* of participation in higher education; a higher share signifying higher participation.
2. Share of graduates and higher educated in the age group of 22 – 35 years provides the *Current Generation Stock (henceforth, CGS) measure*.
3. Share of currently studying persons at the level of graduation and above in the age group of 17 – 29 years (or 18-25 years) provides a *Current Generation Flow (henceforth, CGF) measure* of participation in higher education.

It was also argued that while measuring deficits, using any of the above definitions it is useful to consider the *eligibility* for participating in higher education. Eligibility requirement for enrollment in an under-graduate course is to complete higher secondary education. Thus, instead of focusing on the entire population in the relevant age group, measures of participation can also focus on that segment that has crossed the threshold of higher secondary education. Accordingly, the three measures described above can be defined for eligible population. *A sharper focus on the eligible population brings the links between secondary and tertiary education explicitly into the analytical discussion.*

Analysis of the National Sample Survey (1999-2000, 2004-05 and 2009-10) data, using these measures (see Table 3 and Appendix Table 2) brought out the following useful insights (For details, see Basant and Sen, 2010; 2011; 2012):

- The deficits in higher education for Hindu OBC¹² and to some extent Hindu ST are not very high, particularly when one looks at the currently studying

¹² In fact, the share of Hindu OBC was 25.6 percent among the total graduates in the age group 22-35 years; their share is even higher (28.2 percent) among the currently studying persons. The OBCs currently enjoy 27 per cent reservation. These data are not reported here.

or eligible population. The deficits, however were higher for Muslims (especially Muslim-OBCs) and SCs.

- The econometric analysis of the data showed that once other factors are controlled for, inter-group differences decline in many cases and some kind of reversal of hierarchy takes place. For example, the probability of Hindu ST and Hindu-OBC participation in higher education becomes higher than other marginalized groups in most specifications.

	AGS(20+ years)	CGS(22-35)	CGF(17-29)(18-25)
Hindu SC	3.94	5.57	6.43 (8.73)
Hindu-ST	2.67	3.53	4.23 (5.83)
Hindu -OBC	6.37	9.62	10.38 (13.98)
Hindu-UC	18.49	24.42	18.15 (24.75)
Muslim-OBC	4.04	5.42	6.15 (8.02)
Muslim General	4.25	4.97	6.26 (8.49)
Other Minorities	11.78	16.12	13.64 (18.04)
Total	8.53	11.42	10.44 (14.06)
	AGS: Eligible (20+ yrs)	CGS: Eligible(22-35 yrs)	CGF: Eligible(17-29 years)(18-25 years)
Hindu SC	45.24	49.1	42.81 (50.89)
Hindu-ST	34.96	35.95	33.56 (42.81)
Hindu -OBC	44.47	48.41	40.11 (48.34)
Hindu-UC	57.01	59.4	41.05 (50.76)
Muslim-OBC	45.59	48.36	40.55 (45.70)
Muslim General	42.05	44.58	43.46 (51.35)
Other Minorities	50.19	52.06	36.81 (44.70)
Total	50.13	52.71	40.42 (49.07)

- All different definitions of participation of the full sample indicate that, the participation increased in the year 2010 as compared to the 1999 for all SRCs (Appendix Table 2). A more interesting result emerges from the eligible sample, where participation goes down for all SRCs in both stock definitions, but goes up for all SRCs by CGF definitions, except for the Hindu ST. So the flow definition of participation indicates that completion of higher secondary education is even more important policy tool for expansion of higher education. However, the decline in participation among SRCs following the stock definitions may be due to the base effect of increase in

overall eligible population over the years as compared to the expansion of access to higher education.

- Eligibility turned out to be a critical factor for participation in higher education. Deficits for the under-privileged groups, including Muslims, are significantly lower among the eligible population, even after we control for a variety of other factors. Thus, once persons from under-privileged groups cross the school threshold, the chances of their going to college are quite high. This suggested that a better understanding of the constraints on school education is critical if participation in higher education is to be enhanced.
- Analyses also highlighted the role of the supply side factors in affecting the participation of various groups in higher education presumably through the process of enhancing eligibility.
- The chances of participation in HE increases significantly with parental education and is the highest with parents having graduate education. And this effect persists even after controlling for household expenditures (a proxy for income or the economic status) and socio-religious affiliation (caste and religion, which forms the basis for reservation or discussions around reservation). In fact, the impact of parental education seems to be higher than that of the socio-religious status.

We shall revert to these issues later but it may be useful to mention here that many of these empirical findings resonate well with the insights derived from analyses of participation by minorities in higher education in the US. Fryar and Hawes (2011) identify a variety of factors that influence minority enrollments in higher education in the US: pipeline effects (quantum/proportion of minority students crossing the threshold); availability of financial assistance, parental support, political participation by minorities and their representation in educational institutions. Their empirical exercise does not provide a very clear

picture. While most of these factors play a role albeit a limited or a conditional one, the more interesting finding is that what works for one minority group (say African Americans) may not work for another (say Latinos). This makes policy making a very difficult exercise.

Apart from the factors mentioned earlier in this section, studies have explored returns to education for Muslims to ascertain if low participation in education is due to low returns to education. We will explore this dimension in the next section.

5. Patterns of Employment and Working Conditions¹³

The estimates provided in the Sachar Committee report show that in general, the mean per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) is lower for Muslims than for all SRCs except SCs/STs and the incidence of poverty (headcount) is also higher for Muslims than for all SRCs except SCs/STs. The situation is the same with respect to the intensity of poverty in urban areas; the mean expenditure of the poor as the ratio of poverty line is the lowest for SCs/STs followed very closely by Muslims. In rural areas, the intensity of poverty is somewhat lower for Muslims than for SCs/STs and OBCs. Further exploration of urban poverty showed that the relative situation of Muslims is worse in urban areas, especially smaller towns where they experience the highest poverty levels. As in the case of other SRCs, poverty levels have declined among Muslims but the conditions of Muslims have improved at a slower pace than most other SRCs, especially in urban areas. Moreover, Unni (2010) shows that the proportion of poor among the working ('working poor') population is higher among Muslims. That is, the community constitutes a relatively larger share of the working poor implying thereby poor working conditions.

The living conditions are directly linked to the employment patterns and working conditions of different SRCs. Worker population rates for Muslim

¹³ This subsection draws from Basant and Shariff (2010) to interpret more recent (2009-10) data and for a summary of some recent papers on the subject.

women are lower than for women in other SRCs (Appendix Table 3). As compared to agriculture Muslim workers are concentrated more in secondary and tertiary sectors (Appendix Tables 4a to 4f) which is partly because the extent of landlessness is somewhat higher among Muslims than among SRCs and because a larger proportion of Muslims live in urban areas. Within these two sectors, a larger share of Muslim workers is engaged in manufacturing and retail trade than workers of other SRCs. (data not reported here).

As compared to other SRCs, Muslims are concentrated more in self-employed activities and their participation in regular jobs, especially in non-agriculture is much less than for others. A significantly higher share of Muslim workers in self-employment can be seen in urban areas as compared to rural areas and for women who prefer home-based activities. (see Appendix Tables 5a to 5f). Other sources show that the share of Muslims in regular work, especially in the government, public sector and large private sector is very low.¹⁴

Distribution of workers by activity status for each sector (Table 4) brings out the differences across SRCs more starkly. As compared to other SRCs, a much higher share of Muslim workers are self-employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors; in the primary sector also self-employment is relatively high but not higher than many other SRCs like Hindu-UC, Hindu-OBC and other minorities. In the secondary sector, the share of Muslim workers engaged in regular jobs is somewhat better than SCs and STs, but their participation as regular workers in the tertiary sector is particularly low as compared to other SRCs.

¹⁴ A detailed analysis of employment in different government departments also revealed that Muslim representation is very low and very often they are located in low-end jobs. Moreover, the participation of Muslims in government jobs which involve provision of public services like healthcare (nursing), security (police), etc, is extremely low (see chapter 9 of Sachar Committee report).

Studies have shown that the conditions of work are more precarious for Muslim workers than for most other workers. Their earnings are relatively low among Muslim regular workers. Moreover, vis-à-vis others, a much larger proportion of Muslim workers is engaged in street vending and are without employee benefits and long-term (even written) contracts. Besides, a larger proportion of Muslim self-employed women work with contractors under poor contractual conditions. In other words, their participation in the informal sector is much higher than most other socio-religious groups, especially in own account trade and manufacturing enterprises. (Unni, 2010)

Table 4 : Percentage Distribution of Workers by Activity Status for Different Sectors for Each Socio-religious Category (SRC), All Workers (Rural + Urban; Male + Female), 16-64 years, 2009-10

Sector/Activity Status	Hindu-UC	Hindu-OBC	Hindu-SC	Hindu-ST	Muslim-OBC	Muslim-General	Muslim-All	Other Minorities	All Persons
Primary Sector									
Self-employed	79.1	63.2	36.8	53.5	52.5	59.67	56.3	64.9	59.0
Regular	0.7	0.6	1.2	1.2	1.4	0.5	0.9	1.7	0.9
Casual	20.2	36.2	62.1	45.2	46.1	39.9	42.9	33.3	40.1
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Secondary Sector									
Self-employed	32.4	31.6	21.6	15.5	44.8	40.2	41.6	23.7	29.7
Regular	41.8	19.9	13.2	12.1	12.3	18.2	16.2	22.9	21.1
Casual	25.9	48.5	65.2	72.4	42.9	41.6	42.3	53.4	49.3
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Tertiary Sector									
Self-employed	46.4	51.8	44.2	36.9	63.7	58.0	60.1	37.0	48.7
Regular	50.0	39.9	43.1	48.3	23.1	31.6	28.0	54.1	43.1
Casual	3.6	8.3	12.7	14.9	13.2	10.5	11.8	8.8	8.2
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs

Low participation of Muslims in regular employment and concentration in self-employment has attracted research attention. Obviously, among other things, the links between employment and education are explored along with the possibility of discrimination.

Borooah (2010) argues that participation in regular employment across different social groups is determined by the relative advantage of groups in terms of “attributes” (e.g., educational attainment) and “access” (e.g., reservation for specific groups). In order to analyze the role of these ‘advantages’ he estimates the risks in labour market outcomes for those who are identified as disadvantaged groups. Two concepts of risk are defined. The first, *Employment Risk Ratio*, measures the odds of a person being in regular employment to being in non-regular employment, *given* that she belongs to a particular group. The second, *Group Risk Ratio*, measures the odds of a person being in regular employment, *given* that she belongs to one group against belonging to another group. These concepts of risk are then applied to data for four subgroups in India: forward-caste (FC) Hindus, Hindus from the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), Muslims, and *Dalits* (collectively the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes). The results show that, on both measures of risk, FC Hindus did best in the Indian labour market. This was partly due to their superior labour market attributes - particular in terms of the relatively large number of FC Hindus who were graduates - and partly due to their better access to jobs offering regular employment. When inter-group differences in attributes are neutralized, the favourable labour market performance of FC Hindus is considerably reduced. The paper argues that it is the *lack of attributes* necessary for, rather than *lack of access to*, regular employment that holds back India’s deprived groups. However, to date, the Indian government’s jobs reservation policies has placed little emphasis on improving job-related attributes but, instead, has focused almost entirely on improving access. This paper favours the policy option of improving the educational standards of Dalits and Muslims, a strategy that has been suggested by the Sachar Committee report as well.

But for those who wish to pursue the reservation policy option, the paper’s estimates provide some more interesting insights. As compared to FC Hindus,

Muslims – who, unlike Dalits, are not protected by jobs reservation - suffered from considerable access disadvantage in terms of obtaining regular employment, even after abstracting from their low education levels. Indeed, compared to FC Hindus, the access disadvantage of Muslims was considerably higher than that of the Hindu OBC. So, if the object of jobs reservation is to correct for discriminatory bias in the jobs market, and if reservation is to be extended beyond Dalits, then Muslims have a more compelling case than the Hindu OBC! Although the Sachar Committee did not recommend reservation, these empirical conclusions about relative deprivation are also broadly consistent with the estimates available in the Sachar report (see Chapter 10) especially with regard to Muslim-OBCs). We shall revert to this issue in the final section but one observation on the issues thrown up by this paper is in order. On the basis of the earlier discussion one can argue that perception of discrimination may result in non-seeking of regular jobs even when one has the 'requisite attribute'. This cannot be explicitly analyzed in the framework used in the paper but needs to be recognized.

Bhaumik and Chakrabarty (2010), extend the labour market discussion to earnings. They explore the determinants of the differences in inter-caste and inter-religion earnings in India during the 1987-99. The data show that (while earnings differences between "upper" castes and SC/ST declined between 1987 and 1999, earnings differences between Muslims and non-Muslims have increased, to the detriment of the former. Moreover, inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings can be explained largely by corresponding differences in educational endowment and returns on age (and, hence, experience). However, differences in returns on education do not explain inter-caste and inter-religion earnings differences to a great extent.

Interestingly, they also find that more than "discrimination", "education endowment" differences are more critical to explain earnings differentials

across groups. As was the case with Barooah's results, this clearly highlights the dominating influence and therefore utility of enhancing endowments with better access and investments in education.

Unfortunately, the analysis of earnings across socio-religious groups can only be undertaken for earnings in regular jobs. Insofar as the participation of Muslims in regular jobs is very limited, such comparisons are inadequate to provide a clear picture of earnings differentials. One needs to have data on the earnings among the self-employed, which is not possible given the paucity of data.

Unni (2010) using the NSSO data empirically explores the labour market imperfections in terms of gender and increasing informality. As was the case in earlier studies, the estimates also suggest that participation of Muslims in regular jobs is lower than of other groups even after we control for educational and other characteristics. It is difficult to establish discrimination from these estimates. However, Unni's results are interesting insofar as they show that returns to higher level of education (especially after school) remain higher for Muslims, although they seem to have fallen a bit in recent years, especially for urban males. But despite this, few cross the "threshold" of school. This is consistent with the argument posited above that there is potentially a problem both from the demand side as Muslims may "perceive" their chances of getting jobs to be low¹⁵ as well as from the supply side – given the non-availability of schools in the vicinity of Muslim habitats.

Despite the possibilities mentioned above, limited participation in education by Muslims is intriguing as returns to education remain reasonably high. Das (2008) explores another perspective on labour market outcomes vis-à-vis minorities to explore the issue of discrimination. She explores the hypothesis

¹⁵ Sachar Committee found that those Muslims who are able to qualify for civil services and IIM exams have the same chance as others in getting admissions.

derived from the US labour market literature that ethnic minorities tend to respond to discrimination in the formal labour market by building self-employed ventures in the form of ethnic/minority enclaves. The underlying assumption therefore is that exclusion, discrimination or some kind of disadvantage in formal jobs may result in minorities setting up minority enclaves based on non-farm self-employment. Her empirical results show that while minority enclave hypothesis does not work for Dalits, it does for the Muslims¹⁶ as the latter tend to choose self-employment in non-farm sector over other activity statuses – regular, casual, self-employment in agriculture and being outside the labour force. This is explained by the presence of reservation in government jobs for Dalits and not for Muslims (although some kind of job quotas are available for Muslim-OBCs after the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations) and access to ‘entrepreneurial networks’ for Muslims which is typically not available to Dalits. Interestingly, post-primary education reduces the probability of Muslims participating in self-employment in non-agriculture (and in regular employment as was the case earlier) and instead increases the likelihood of withdrawing from the labour force or participating in the casual labour market. Given this and the fact that data are not available on earnings in self-employment, it is not possible to assess if minorities are indeed able to build ‘lucrative’ self-employed ventures. However, given the poverty rates and the working conditions described in Unni (2010) and reported above, the possibility of ‘lucrative’ self-employed ventures is very low. Das (2008) argues that lower participation of Muslims with post-primary education in regular jobs reflects discrimination. Another interpretation of these results could be that given the perceptions of discrimination, Muslim men who have some option to be self-employed do not prefer post-primary education; the others who do, have very limited or no access to the networks that Das refers to. As a result, even after post-primary education, Muslims are not able to build self-employed enterprises and limited job

¹⁶ The exercise is done only for males.

opportunities/discrimination keeps them out of the regular jobs. The option for them is either to withdraw from the labour force or participate in the casual labour market. However this interpretation is also somewhat incomplete as the poor typically cannot afford to be outside the labour market. Moreover, Das's study clubs together all types of post-primary education; it is possible that a more dis-aggregated education variable that distinguishes between secondary, higher secondary and college education may have provided a clearer picture with self-employment and education among Muslims showing a non-linear relationship. This is clearly an area where some more work needs to be done.

6. Concluding Observations and Policy Options

Taken together the discussion in the earlier sections brings out the following key insights on Muslims participation in education and employment:

- As compared to other religions, Muslims have a higher perception of unfairness and this sense of discrimination is especially high in the employment and education spaces;
- Participation of Muslims is relatively low in the education space but has improved in recent years. However, the situation is particularly poor in urban areas, especially for Muslim males;
- The participation of Muslims in higher education is particularly poor but once they cross the threshold of school education and once other factors that affect participation in higher education, the deficits for Muslims decline significantly. Therefore, a focus on eligibility is quite critical for Muslims as for other marginalized groups and consequently the links between secondary and tertiary education are quite important for Muslims especially because the drop-out rates are quite high after middle school;
- While limited access (supply of schools) and discrimination is not ruled out, household endowments along with location play a critical role in determining participation of Muslims in the education space. There is some

evidence to suggest that the Community does not fully appreciate the rewards of education even as returns to education are high;

- Muslims are predominantly engaged in self-employment and their participation as regular workers especially in the tertiary sector (that has grown in recent years) in urban areas is low as compared to other SRCs.
- While there is some evidence to suggest that Muslims choose self-employment to avoid discrimination in the formal labour market, educational endowments and other attributes like experience explain a large part of the differentials across SRCs in participation in regular employment as well as earnings. At the same time attributes are not able to fully explain these differentials and therefore discrimination remains an issue so does the measurement of attributes like quality of education.

What do these broad patterns suggest for policy? Apart from other policies that enhance supply of educational facilities, affirmative action in the education and employment spaces is seen as an important policy initiative. Typically, this takes the form of reservation or quotas. Weisskopf (2010) evaluates the efficacy of positive discrimination such as reservations for reducing the social and economic marginalization of disadvantaged ethnic communities in India. His insightful analysis suggests that apart from being time-bound and flexible to the changing circumstances, policy of positive discrimination is more likely to be successful if the beneficiary community is fairly homogeneous; its members have been and continue to be subject to mistreatment and stigmatization by other communities; and they are significantly under-represented in esteemed positions in society. Moreover, such policies should be applied in those activities and well-endowed institutions where the possibility of acquiring human and social capital for the beneficiary is high. But at the same time the activity should be such that the quality of performance of the beneficiary affects mainly the beneficiary and not others. In order to ensure adequate performance post preferential access, the magnitude of the preference granted

to beneficiaries should not be very large either. If the magnitude of the preference is very high, the beneficiaries may not be able to perform well in jobs and education, resulting in the perpetuation of stigmatization. The author also argues in favour of a selection process that is capable – at least to some extent – of identifying those formally under-qualified applicants who are most likely to succeed if given the opportunity. Finally, according to the author, the success of such a policy will also require that the beneficiaries are afforded significant human and financial support *after* being preferentially selected and these individual beneficiaries are not clearly identifiable as different from all of their peers.

Clearly, getting a policy set and instruments together that satisfy all these conditions is very difficult. A few interesting points stand out. Increase in the heterogeneity among the beneficiary groups and in the magnitude of preference would make the policy less efficacious. Human and financial support *post preferential selection* should be seen as policies that are *complementary* to the policies of preferential access. Interestingly, in the current policy debate, the fact of heterogeneity within different SRCs is used against policies of reservation (e.g., the issue of creamy layer) and financial support is seen as a substitute to reservation policy. It is useful to note again in this context that even within the Muslim community, the perspectives on the role of reservation vary a great deal and one of the factors that underscore the differences in these perspectives is the underlying perception of heterogeneity within the Community.

Desai and Kulkarni (2010) provide some more insights on the role of reservation as they evaluate the trends in educational inequalities across religion and caste in the context of affirmative action in India and argue that it potentially reduces these inequalities: (1) Secular growth in education (partly through the impact of policies directed to the *whole population*) that would

benefit all groups reducing educational deprivation of the marginalized groups; (2) Positive discrimination policies benefiting the targeted disadvantaged groups. By comparing educational attainment of different socio-religious groups between 1983 and 2000, this paper explores the role of these two forces. Comparison between Muslims who were not included in affirmative action policies and dalits and adivasis, who were, allows the authors to explore the role of secular changes vis-à-vis positive discrimination. Their results show an increase in educational attainments for *all* groups and at various levels, primary, middle school and college completion. The results also show a *declining gap* between *dalits*, *adivasis*, and upper caste Hindus in primary and middle school completion over the years. The gaps between Muslims and upper caste Hindus, however, have not been declining and education growth in other SRCs has outpaced the education growth for Muslims, a fact highlighted by the Sachar Committee report as well.¹⁷ The authors argue that this is primarily because of lack of reservation for Muslims. Reservations or quotas in government employment can potentially enhance returns to education for *dalits* and *adivasis*, creating incentives to participate in education.¹⁸

For Muslims, there is no positive discrimination, except for those who have been categorized as OBCs, a fact not recognized by the authors. While the job reservation has existed for SCs and STs for a long time, the OBC reservation is of recent origin as it was initiated only in the 1990s. Therefore, the indirect effect of job reservation in creating incentives for education may take some time in the case of OBC Muslims covered under the scheme. But to say that there is no affirmative action for Muslims would be factually incorrect.¹⁹ While the

¹⁷ The data analysed above suggests that there is some reversal to this trend since 2004-05.

¹⁸ For example, primary education can enhance the earning potential for *dalit* and *adivasi* candidates by making them eligible for lower level government jobs instead of having them to rely on sporadically available manual labor in the private sector.

¹⁹ An added complication emerges from extensive diversity within Muslims, such as OBCs and dalits and its considerably variation across states. While Assam and West Bengal have 30 % and 25 % of their respective populations as Muslims, practically none have reported themselves as the OBCs. On the contrary, Kerala's 25 per

authors argue in favour of reservations, they do not consider this policy of nearly six decades to be an unqualified success:

“While noting the success of the Indian affirmative action policies, it is also important to note the modest size of this success for all the groups. Although situation is improving, at each educational level, *dalits* and *adivasis* continue to lag behind upper caste Hindus and others. These disadvantages seem to accumulate at higher education levels. It is also important to note that quotas in college admission have caused great public resistance. However, our results show no improvement and even mild deterioration in college graduation rates for *dalits*, casting doubt on the effectiveness of these policies.” (Desai and Kulkarni, 2010)

Moreover, they also recognize that while the government reserves seats for *dalit* and *adivasi* students at college level, at a lower level, village schools continue to discriminate against them, preventing them from advancing to the college level to take full advantage of these reservations. This observation ties up with the important finding reported above that the gaps across SRCs in graduate attainment rates decline dramatically once the eligibility for college education is controlled for. In other words, once the disadvantaged groups cross the eligibility hurdle of school education, the chances of their going to college improve significantly and under some circumstances are not very different from the other SRCs. The complexity of the role of reservation gets further enhanced when we combined this evidence with the evidence on returns to education which for Muslims (especially for higher education) remain high, although have fallen in recent years (except for Muslim males in 2004-05). In fact, for certain years, returns to education for Muslims are higher, especially in rural areas. Under these circumstances, even without reservation, the demand for higher education should go up. However, the estimates for returns are quite volatile

cent Muslim population have all of them reported themselves as OBCs; and the state has already provided 12 % reservation exclusively for Muslims. The coverage of Muslim OBCs differs across states.

over the years and do not provide a robust picture. Moreover, given the non-availability of data, such returns can only be computed for wage earnings; returns in self-employment cannot be computed.

A major fall out of reservation policies has been that it is increasingly seen as a competition between preferred and non-preferred groups. In most situations in India, these policies have only resulted in a marginal impact if one looks at it in the economy wide perspective. For example, reservation policies are applicable only in the state sector. Jobs and higher education institutions in the State sector increasingly form a small share of the overall availability in the economy as a whole. However, even 'minor transfers' of benefits to the preferred group results in 'major resentment' among the non-preferred group. And this resentment not only results in political or legal action but more violent protests.²⁰ Therefore, Community specific policy instruments, especially those that create quotas may not be very useful.

We have argued elsewhere that apart from the legal problems of interpretation and political ramifications, implementation of the reservation policies in India requires information that encompasses sociological, anthropological and economic dimensions. Such information is not only problematic to collect but also difficult to interpret even for a social scientist 'skilled in the art'. Even when, reservation is seen as the most appropriate policy instrument for affirmative action, one should try and find a simpler way of dealing with such a policy instrument (Basant and Sen, 2012).

Given the problems of information failures and asymmetries and a variety of other factors mentioned above, parental education can potentially be a good criterion for affirmative action as it is easy to measure and does not have any problems associated with designation and re-designation of castes for

²⁰ Admittedly, such resentment is partly due to the fact that some of these jobs and higher education institutions are most coveted among the available options.

reservation purposes. Such a criterion also makes sense given the changing role of caste in social stratification. Parental education provides a criterion which is essentially dynamic in nature and temporary as the status of parental education is bound to change over time. The empirical results discussed earlier have shown that participation in higher education increases with parental education even after we control for other factors and children of graduate parents have the high participation rate. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, deficits in participation in higher education are higher when parental education is lower. Consequently, *prima facie*, children with illiterate parents can potentially form the most backward category for affirmative action, followed by those having parents with secondary or less education and those with higher secondary education. Children with parents having graduate education may be outside the purview of affirmative action. If Aadhar (UID-Unique Identification Number) becomes a reality and everybody has a unique identity with requisite information, implementing a programme on this basis will not suffer from information failures.²¹ While such a policy takes away affirmative action from caste, religion and even economic status, the policy makers need to move away from policies of reservation and quotas. And of course irrespective of what policies are adopted, the core issue of facilitating the marginalized groups to cross the threshold of school education would remain the key challenge for policy makers as far as participation in higher education is concerned.

Besides, given the links between economic and political spaces, there is a need to enhance participation of Muslims in governance. Nominations of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities (depending on the context) in local level bodies as is the case in Andhra Pradesh would be a good starting point. The

²¹ Issues relating to quality of education still remain unaddressed as parents with better quality education may affect their children's choices more effectively. The available data is not able to distinguish these effects. given the differential impact of different levels of parental education, one can think of well-defined compartments: children with illiterate parents can potentially form the most backward category followed by those having parents with secondary or less education and those with higher secondary education. Children with parents having graduate education may be outside the purview of affirmative action. (see Basant and Sen 2012 for more details)

delimitation procedures need to be rationalized urgently so that constituencies with high minority population share are not reserved for SCs, which seems to be the case in many states. The links between political participation and education attainment observed in the case of US (Fryar and Hawes, 2011) can be invoked to support such policy as well.

The need to enhance diversity in different spaces is urgent. For this purpose, as suggested in the Sachar report, it may be desirable to evolve an acceptable, transparent *diversity index* which may include SRC status, gender and other elements depending on the context. Certain incentives for educational institutions, private sector, builders, etc, can be linked with this diversity index. For example, an educational institution can get additional grants for diverse student population, firms can get some tax cuts for diverse workforce and builders can get land at concessional rates if they are making composite housing societies. Eventually, diversity should be a corporate social responsibility. Creation of such an index is admittedly a difficult task but some informed debate on the issue would be useful. In the same vein, creation of common public spaces for interaction among SRCs can be facilitated through state-community-private sector partnerships. And more importantly, the policy discussion would move away from ‘reservation syndrome’ which has not allowed any experimentation.

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Appendix Table 1a: Percentage Distribution of Persons by Education for Each Socio-religious Category (SRC), Rural Male, 17-29 years									
<i>Year/Education</i>	<i>Hindu-UC</i>	<i>Hindu-OBC</i>	<i>Hindu-SC</i>	<i>Hindu-ST</i>	<i>Muslim-OBC</i>	<i>Muslim-General</i>	<i>Muslim-All</i>	<i>Other Minorities</i>	<i>All Persons</i>
1999-00									
Not literate	9.35	24.2	31.11	39.61	25.82	30.75	29.25	20.4	23.91
Secondary & below	68.09	64.28	59.91	51.27	67.49	61	63.02	66.02	63.07
Higher secondary	14.68	8.58	6.29	7.44	4.98	5.25	5.13	10.95	9.18
Graduate & above	7.87	2.94	2.69	1.68	1.7	3.01	2.59	2.63	3.84
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2004-05									
Not literate	7.92	16.74	24.46	32.10	24.05	23.34	23.69	15.03	18.75
Secondary & below	66.62	68.54	65.57	60.64	68.24	67.94	67.80	70.54	66.94
Higher secondary	16.80	10.08	7.20	5.42	5.20	5.94	5.73	10.88	9.84
Graduate & above	8.66	4.64	2.77	1.83	2.50	2.78	2.78	3.55	4.47
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2009-10									
Not literate	3.31	10.30	17.54	19.63	18.16	15.66	17.17	7.84	12.26
Secondary & below	60.18	65.84	68.71	67.85	68.96	73.01	71.07	64.31	66.25
Higher secondary	24.49	17.49	10.44	9.59	8.28	8.27	8.19	21.36	15.48
Graduate & above	12.02	6.37	3.31	2.93	4.61	3.06	3.57	6.49	6.01
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 1b: Percentage Distribution of Persons by Education for Each Socio-religious Category (SRC), Rural Female, 17-29 years

<i>Year/Education</i>	<i>Hindu-UC</i>	<i>Hindu-OBC</i>	<i>Hindu-SC</i>	<i>Hindu-ST</i>	<i>Muslim-OBC</i>	<i>Muslim-General</i>	<i>Muslim-All</i>	<i>Other Minorities</i>	<i>All Persons</i>
1999-00									
Not literate	27.22	53.68	62.54	70.87	49.2	57.24	54.92	29.71	50.09
Secondary & below	60.59	41.62	34.65	25.73	47.17	40.29	42.29	56.94	43.8
Higher secondary	8.34	3.41	2.03	3.15	2.47	1.97	2.11	9.46	4.38
Graduate & above	3.85	1.29	0.79	0.25	1.16	0.5	0.68	3.89	1.73
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2004-05									
Not literate	18.98	41.43	52.36	62.38	50.21	42.12	45.22	21.51	41.00
Secondary & below	63.33	50.74	42.50	33.98	44.35	54.16	50.40	60.89	50.26
Higher secondary	11.54	5.84	3.69	3.01	4.56	2.90	3.55	12.58	6.24
Graduate & above	6.16	1.99	1.45	0.64	0.88	0.82	0.83	5.02	2.51
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2009-10									
Not literate	11.82	28.61	37.15	42.86	41.52	28.66	34.70	15.07	29.18
Secondary & below	61.59	56.83	54.05	50.50	50.37	66.40	59.00	61.67	56.88
Higher secondary	17.83	10.34	6.36	5.02	5.92	3.51	4.60	16.41	9.79
Graduate & above	8.76	4.22	2.43	1.62	2.19	1.43	1.71	6.85	4.15
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 1c: Percentage Distribution of Persons by Education for Each Socio-religious Category (SRC), Urban Male, 17-29 years									
<i>Year/Education</i>	<i>Hindu-UC</i>	<i>Hindu-OBC</i>	<i>Hindu-SC</i>	<i>Hindu-ST</i>	<i>Muslim-OBC</i>	<i>Muslim-General</i>	<i>Muslim-All</i>	<i>Other Minorities</i>	<i>All Persons</i>
1999-00									
Not literate	3.73	10.15	18.17	16.33	24.46	18.76	20.88	3.9	10.47
Secondary & below	51.45	64.63	66.11	64.82	64.15	64.77	64.36	55.81	59.52
Higher secondary	24.16	15.69	10.46	11.85	8.26	11.3	10.31	23.53	17.53
Graduate & above	20.66	9.53	5.27	7.00	3.13	5.17	4.45	16.76	12.48
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2004-05									
Not literate	2.83	7.48	12.37	11.86	20.06	15.13	16.92	4.44	8.25
Secondary & below	48.45	63.95	69.82	63.70	67.04	67.10	67.22	52.53	59.79
Higher secondary	25.43	16.27	12.42	16.38	8.24	9.83	9.17	23.50	17.83
Graduate & above	23.29	12.30	5.39	8.07	4.66	7.94	6.69	19.53	14.13
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2009-10									
Not literate	2.44	4.59	11.13	5.66	14.94	9.67	11.91	3.60	5.98
Secondary & below	40.68	54.77	61.41	55.01	62.41	67.21	65.43	45.21	52.49
Higher secondary	27.72	22.86	17.39	24.59	16.75	16.88	16.58	29.52	23.03
Graduate & above	29.16	17.78	10.08	14.75	5.91	6.24	6.08	21.67	18.51
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 1d: Percentage Distribution of Persons by Education for Each Socio-religious Category (SRC), Urban Female, 17-29 years

<i>Year/Education</i>	<i>Hindu-UC</i>	<i>Hindu-OBC</i>	<i>Hindu-SC</i>	<i>Hindu-ST</i>	<i>Muslim-OBC</i>	<i>Muslim-General</i>	<i>Muslim-All</i>	<i>Other Minorities</i>	<i>All Persons</i>
1999-00									
Not literate	7.83	22.52	39.5	42.32	29.58	30.02	30.06	7.12	20.18
Secondary & below	47.35	56.92	48.65	41.96	60.23	55.27	56.98	49.84	51.54
Higher secondary	21.74	13.3	8.76	9.96	7.13	9.14	8.28	23.88	15.56
Graduate & above	23.08	7.25	3.09	5.77	3.07	5.57	4.68	19.17	12.73
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2004-05									
Not literate	5.84	17.42	26.82	35.64	27.69	21.10	23.38	4.92	15.61
Secondary & below	43.86	57.22	57.81	42.73	62.19	59.98	60.03	47.35	52.49
Higher secondary	23.94	14.59	8.21	14.00	6.43	11.18	9.81	23.08	16.45
Graduate & above	26.36	10.76	7.16	7.63	3.68	7.73	6.79	24.64	15.45
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
2009-10									
Not literate	4.21	10.84	20.39	19.15	23.30	16.50	19.86	4.06	11.23
Secondary & below	37.23	51.91	54.30	46.59	54.95	59.90	57.61	41.47	47.71
Higher secondary	27.25	20.94	13.86	20.91	13.59	16.35	14.90	26.56	21.38
Graduate & above	31.31	16.30	11.46	13.35	8.16	7.26	7.63	27.91	19.67
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 2: Share of Population in the Relevant Age Groups Participating in Higher Education for Each Socio Religious Category									
	AGS(20+ years)			CGS(22-35)			CGF(17-29)(18-25)		
	1999-00	2004-05	2009-10	1999-00	2004-05	2009-10	1999-00	2004-05	2009-10
H-SC	2.46	2.47	3.94	3.61	3.74	5.57	2.48 (3.28)	3.59 (4.52)	6.43 (8.73)
H-ST	1.71	1.65	2.67	2.11	2.34	3.53	2.97 (4.06)	3.42 (4.41)	4.23 (5.83)
H-OBC	3.65	4.39	6.37	5.22	6.39	9.62	3.49 (4.53)	5.00 (6.49)	10.38 (13.98)
H-UC	14.16	15.25	18.49	17.69	19.29	24.42	9.58 (13.0)	11.24 (15.28)	18.15 (24.75)
M-OBC	2.30	2.48	4.04	2.97	3.26	5.42	2.12 (2.70)	3.92 (5.03)	6.15 (8.02)
M-G	3.79	4.14	4.25	4.80	5.09	4.97	3.05 (3.93)	4.09 (5.28)	6.26 (8.49)
OM	9.46	9.03	11.78	12.40	11.89	16.12	8.04 (10.76)	8.00 (10.48)	13.64 (18.04)
Total	6.46	6.60	8.53	8.25	8.62	11.42	5.03 (6.65)	6.07 (7.88)	10.44 (14.06)
	AGS: Eligible (20+ yrs)			CGS: Eligible(22-35 yrs)			CGF: Eligible(17-29 years)(18-25 years)		
H-SC	50.61	39.85	45.24	52.81	43.67	49.1	32.29 (40.03)	32.25 (38.64)	42.81 (50.89)
H-ST	41.27	37.67	34.96	39.17	40.56	35.95	40.42 (47.88)	41.71 (46.41)	33.56 (42.81)
H-OBC	50.19	42.18	44.47	50.62	44.88	48.41	29.91 (37.25)	28.86 (35.67)	40.11 (48.34)
H-UC	63.90	56.68	57.01	64.65	58.50	59.4	33.80 (43.66)	31.55 (41.34)	41.05 (50.76)
M-OBC	47.96	37.70	45.59	48.89	40.94	48.36	29.20 (33.77)	36.09 (41.43)	40.55 (45.70)
M-G	53.15	49.07	42.05	54.66	51.17	44.58	32.88 (40.31)	35.40 (41.99)	43.46 (51.35)
OM	62.24	46.42	50.19	61.53	46.62	52.06	35.12 (42.95)	27.89 (35.70)	36.81 (44.70)
Total	58.54	49.33	50.13	58.68	51.04	52.71	32.97 (41.56)	31.13 (39.07)	40.42 (49.07)

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 3: Worker Participation Rates by Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Principal and Secondary Status Workers , India, 16-64 years												
SRC	Rural Male			Rural Female			Urban Male			Urban Female		
	1999-2000	2004-05	2009-10	1999-2000	2004-05	2009-10	1999-2000	2004-05	2009-10	1999-2000	2004-05	2009-10
Hindu -UC	84.64	86.32	82.80	38.40	43.45	31.15	77.39	78.34	77.88	15.8	19.54	15.77
Hindu-OBC	89.86	89.64	86.39	50.56	54.80	43.02	82.22	83.41	80.45	25.26	58.73	22.39
Hindu - SC	89.34	90.25	87.37	52.99	54.29	41.99	81.57	81.17	81.24	29.92	29.95	25.67
Hindu-ST	92.12	92.16	89.90	72.37	73.91	55.87	80.53	80.38	76.38	34.79	39.24	28.17
Muslim-OBC	87.35	86.42	84.15	29.18	31.14	23.12	83.62	83.53	81.59	17.74	20.08	13.80
Muslim-General	88.88	89.47	87.21	26.94	28.13	20.78	81.58	84.76	81.48	14.77	17.08	14.22
Muslim-All	88.52	88.26	86.21	27.89	29.40	22.07	82.29	84.31	81.49	15.76	18.08	14.25
Other Minorities	86.43	87.01	82.47	48.73	57.31	42.91	75.81	77.02	77.29	24.60	27.56	27.02
All Persons	88.49	89.13	86.07	47.98	51.73	39.70	79.85	81.03	79.56	21.06	24.28	19.79

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 4a: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Industrial Affiliation for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Rural India, (Male + Female) 16-64 years									
SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Hindu -UC	74.76	8.32	16.91	70.39	10.15	19.46	68.07	11.67	20.26
Hindu-OBC	76.25	11.65	12.09	73.59	13.30	13.11	68.97	16.68	14.38
Hindu - SC	76.60	12.94	10.46	71.11	16.92	11.97	63.60	23.66	12.73
Hindu-ST	85.49	8.95	5.55	83.52	10.66	5.81	80.27	13.28	6.45
Muslim-OBC	55.40	20.39	24.21	50.58	23.50	25.92	48.92	25.99	25.09
Muslim-General	62.46	17.06	20.48	59.46	20.33	20.22	52.08	26.57	21.35
Muslim-All	60.53	17.92	21.55	56.40	21.35	22.24	51.47	25.95	22.58
Other Minorities	76.92	9.31	13.77	72.10	12.57	15.32	65.83	16.09	18.08
All Persons	75.79	11.34	12.87	72.02	13.87	14.11	67.16	17.79	15.05

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 4b: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Industrial Affiliation for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Urban India (Male + Female), 16-64 years									
SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Hindu -UC	4.92	28.04	67.04	4.90	28.31	66.79	3.88	27.60	68.52
Hindu-OBC	11.88	35.40	52.72	12.07	36.91	51.03	10.53	37.03	52.43
Hindu - SC	13.35	34.37	52.29	9.18	37.47	50.53	7.81	39.23	52.96
Hindu-ST	20.05	33.90	46.05	19.84	31.28	48.88	13.84	35.69	50.47
Muslim-OBC	5.84	38.72	55.43	6.00	42.68	51.33	4.88	41.38	53.74
Muslim-General	4.71	35.75	59.54	4.39	39.24	56.37	3.91	43.53	52.57
Muslim-All	5.19	36.52	58.29	5.53	40.28	54.18	4.31	42.81	52.88
Other Minorities	6.73	25.72	67.55	7.64	26.94	65.42	8.55	27.99	63.46
All Persons	8.55	32.14	59.30	8.33	33.94	57.73	7.14	34.53	58.34

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 4c: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Industrial Affiliation for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Rural India, Males, 16-64 years

SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Hindu -UC	68.57	9.96	21.47	64.24	11.28	24.48	63.47	12.75	23.78
Hindu-OBC	71.28	13.21	15.50	66.98	15.70	17.32	63.51	18.78	17.71
Hindu - SC	71.12	15.47	13.40	63.82	20.75	15.43	56.88	27.67	15.45
Hindu-ST	81.09	11.21	7.70	78.37	13.33	8.30	76.90	14.49	8.53
Muslim-OBC	49.48	20.41	30.11	43.34	24.20	32.45	44.26	25.88	29.87
Muslim-General	60.32	15.29	24.39	58.90	17.51	23.59	51.53	24.77	23.70
Muslim-All	57.32	16.73	25.95	53.56	19.81	26.62	49.25	24.91	25.84
Other Minorities	71.25	11.51	17.24	64.23	16.04	19.73	59.60	20.17	20.23
All Persons	70.27	13.03	16.70	65.40	16.13	18.47	61.73	19.88	18.38

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 4d: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Industrial Affiliation for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Rural India, Females, 16-64 years

SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Hindu -UC	88.47	4.70	6.83	82.67	7.89	9.44	80.67	8.70	10.64
Hindu-OBC	85.13	8.87	6.01	84.35	9.39	6.26	80.00	12.44	7.56
Hindu - SC	86.16	8.51	5.33	83.49	10.41	6.10	77.84	15.19	6.97
Hindu-ST	91.14	6.06	2.80	89.99	7.32	2.69	85.55	11.34	3.11
Muslim-OBC	72.15	20.35	7.51	68.06	21.79	10.15	65.28	26.37	8.35
Muslim-General	69.46	22.80	7.74	61.27	29.53	9.20	54.55	34.54	10.90
Muslim-All	70.49	21.61	7.91	64.63	25.82	9.55	60.29	30.10	9.61
Other Minorities	86.86	5.45	7.68	83.80	7.42	8.78	77.50	8.45	14.05
All Persons	86.04	8.20	5.76	83.40	9.98	6.62	79.05	13.21	7.73

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 4e: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Industrial Affiliation for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Urban India, Males, 16-64 years									
SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Hindu -UC	3.86	29.91	66.24	3.69	29.03	67.28	3.47	28.53	68.00
Hindu-OBC	8.82	35.97	55.21	7.98	38.28	53.75	8.17	36.91	54.91
Hindu - SC	9.12	36.86	54.02	6.06	39.66	54.27	5.76	40.43	53.81
Hindu-ST	14.83	35.23	49.94	12.59	33.08	54.33	10.94	39.41	49.65
Muslim-OBC	4.87	35.61	59.52	4.42	37.99	57.59	4.08	37.99	57.93
Muslim-General	3.58	33.97	62.45	3.27	38.02	58.71	3.50	41.68	54.82
Muslim-All	4.06	34.31	61.63	4.28	37.72	57.99	3.74	40.27	55.99
Other Minorities	5.08	28.58	66.34	5.81	28.22	65.97	6.87	32.06	61.07
All Persons	6.22	33.11	60.68	5.69	34.59	59.72	5.64	34.87	59.48

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 4f: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Industrial Affiliation for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Urban India, Females, 16-64 years									
SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Hindu -UC	10.69	17.92	71.39	10.22	25.14	64.64	6.06	22.67	71.27
Hindu-OBC	22.76	33.38	43.87	25.26	32.49	42.24	19.83	37.51	42.66
Hindu - SC	26.41	26.66	46.93	18.73	30.74	50.53	15.03	34.99	49.98
Hindu-ST	32.68	30.69	36.63	35.87	27.31	36.82	22.07	25.11	52.82
Muslim-OBC	10.87	54.80	34.34	12.91	63.26	23.83	9.64	61.73	28.62
Muslim-General	11.74	46.83	41.43	10.62	45.99	43.39	6.49	55.16	38.35
Muslim-All	11.78	49.41	38.81	11.86	53.23	34.91	7.80	58.26	33.95
Other Minorities	11.87	16.79	71.34	12.99	23.20	63.80	13.41	16.20	70.39
All Persons	18.30	28.11	53.59	18.00	31.58	50.43	13.61	33.03	53.36

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 5a: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Activity Status for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Rural India, (Male + Female), 16-64 years

SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual
Hindu -UC	68.99	11.20	19.81	72.25	11.04	16.70	68.32	11.28	20.41
Hindu-OBC	59.27	6.31	34.42	63.99	6.84	29.17	57.54	6.74	35.72
Hindu - SC	34.98	5.99	59.02	40.80	6.53	52.67	35.36	6.67	57.97
Hindu-ST	47.43	4.41	48.16	52.08	4.08	43.85	47.79	4.83	47.38
Muslim-OBC	56.09	7.33	36.59	64.58	7.00	28.42	53.17	7.12	39.71
Muslim-General	58.52	6.14	35.34	61.72	6.08	32.20	55.23	7.45	37.32
Muslim-All	57.67	6.48	35.85	62.73	6.42	30.86	53.92	7.41	38.68
Other Minorities	54.95	10.51	34.54	60.27	10.94	28.79	53.21	12.66	34.13
All Persons	54.58	7.26	38.17	59.22	7.39	33.39	53.05	7.59	39.36

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Appendix Table 5b: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Activity Status for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Urban India (Male + Female), 16-64 years

SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual
Hindu -UC	40.14	52.22	7.64	44.03	49.29	6.43	41.85	52.17	5.98
Hindu-OBC	42.80	35.77	21.42	46.13	36.61	17.25	41.10	38.08	20.83
Hindu - SC	32.39	34.28	33.33	33.59	40.28	26.13	29.11	40.43	30.45
Hindu-ST	28.19	33.21	38.61	32.18	38.63	29.20	26.24	41.10	32.66
Muslim-OBC	57.52	23.31	19.17	62.84	20.53	16.63	55.57	22.22	22.21
Muslim-General	50.71	31.22	18.07	53.91	31.27	14.82	47.80	34.01	18.19
Muslim-All	52.93	28.52	18.55	57.39	27.00	15.61	50.82	29.01	20.17
Other Minorities	38.51	46.60	14.89	41.11	44.87	14.02	35.76	45.42	18.82
All Persons	41.20	40.96	17.84	44.64	40.39	14.97	40.38	42.15	17.46

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Table 5c: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Activity Status for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Rural India, Males, 16-64 years

SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual
Hindu -UC	66.50	14.24	19.26	69.6	13.7	16.7	66.85	12.75	20.40
Hindu-OBC	58.72	8.20	33.09	62.21	8.95	28.83	57.43	8.23	34.34
Hindu - SC	34.21	7.68	58.10	38.29	8.26	53.44	34.20	7.47	58.33
Hindu-ST	45.51	6.21	48.28	49.57	5.64	44.79	46.17	6.54	47.29
Muslim-OBC	51.89	8.72	39.39	60.72	8.61	30.68	49.32	8.28	42.40
Muslim-General	55.38	7.31	37.31	57.83	7.05	35.12	53.66	8.04	38.29
Muslim-All	54.28	7.72	38.00	58.76	7.59	33.65	51.35	8.24	40.41
Other Minorities	52.27	12.94	34.80	54.35	13.56	32.09	49.33	14.43	36.24
All Persons	53.44	9.40	37.17	56.87	9.46	33.67	52.13	8.97	38.90

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Table 5d: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Activity Status for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Rural India, Females, 16-64 years

SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual
Hindu -UC	74.50	4.45	21.05	77.54	5.74	16.71	72.35	7.23	20.42
Hindu-OBC	60.25	2.95	36.79	66.89	3.4	29.71	57.76	3.72	38.53
Hindu - SC	36.32	3.05	60.63	45.05	3.59	51.36	37.81	5.00	57.19
Hindu-ST	49.89	2.10	48.01	55.22	2.12	42.66	50.38	2.09	47.52
Muslim-OBC	67.93	3.39	28.67	73.93	3.1	22.97	66.69	3.03	30.28
Muslim-General	68.75	2.32	28.93	74.42	2.9	22.68	62.19	4.80	33.01
Muslim-All	68.17	2.62	29.21	74.22	3	22.78	64.11	4.08	31.81
Other Minorities	59.67	6.25	34.08	69.08	7.04	23.88	60.47	9.34	30.20
All Persons	56.69	3.29	40.02	63.26	3.83	32.91	55.06	4.58	40.36

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Table 5e: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Activity Status for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Urban India, Males, 16-64 years

SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual
Hindu -UC	40.18	52.26	7.56	44.26	49.31	6.43	42.79	51.28	5.93
Hindu-OBC	41.06	38.57	20.37	44.19	39.06	16.75	40.16	39.75	20.08
Hindu - SC	30.77	37.05	32.18	33.31	41.01	25.69	28.31	41.52	30.17
Hindu-ST	26.84	38.69	34.46	30.07	44.92	25.01	26.57	43.43	30.00
Muslim-OBC	54.63	25.09	20.28	60.45	22.40	17.16	53.59	23.07	23.34
Muslim-General	48.63	33.06	18.31	52.05	32.29	15.66	46.82	35.14	18.04
Muslim-All	50.67	30.32	19.01	55.31	28.41	16.28	49.49	30.06	20.45
Other Minorities	40.63	44.32	15.05	43.83	41.87	14.30	36.49	43.02	20.49
All Persons	40.51	42.52	16.97	44.10	41.41	14.49	40.36	42.62	17.02

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.

Table 5f: Percentage Distribution of Workers (Principal and Subsidiary) by Activity Status for Each Socio-Religious Categories (SRC), Urban India, Females, 16-64 years

SRC	1999-2000			2004-05			2009-10		
	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual	Self-employed	Regular	Casual
Hindu -UC	39.90	52.03	8.08	43.03	49.19	7.78	36.86	56.91	6.24
Hindu-OBC	49.01	25.83	25.16	52.42	28.72	18.86	44.76	31.46	23.78
Hindu - SC	37.40	25.74	36.86	34.46	38.06	27.48	31.94	36.61	31.45
Hindu-ST	31.44	19.95	48.62	36.85	24.68	38.47	25.31	34.49	40.20
Muslim-OBC	72.43	14.10	13.47	73.37	12.32	14.31	67.41	17.16	15.43
Muslim-General	63.67	19.80	16.53	64.21	25.62	10.17	53.96	26.88	19.16
Muslim-All	66.13	18.03	15.85	67.92	19.85	12.23	58.90	22.63	18.47
Other Minorities	31.88	53.71	14.40	33.18	53.64	13.19	33.65	52.37	13.98
All Persons	44.09	34.43	21.48	46.61	36.66	16.73	40.48	40.13	19.40

Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs.