

# Policy uncertainty spillovers across G7 countries and central banks gold reserves: an empirical exploration with future directions

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# Presentation Flow

1. Background
2. Empirical Methods
3. Results
4. Conclusion, implications, limitations and future scope

# Background and Introduction

Record high demand for gold by the global central banks in 2022 and 2023




Figure 1. Quarterly official gold holdings and gold as a percentage of total reserves held by global central banks

# Preference for gold

- The preference for gold in the central bank's balance sheet is credited to the confidence it instils in fiat currency during financial and political emergencies, and its use as collateral
- Global financial crisis, European debt crisis, COVID-19 pandemic period followed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 with record high inflation and banking panics was (and is still) a perfect mix of these challenges
- **Existing studies-** Macroeconomic, Financial and Geopolitical factors (Ghosh, 2016; Gopalakrishnan and Mohapatra, 2018; Oztunç and Orhan, 2021; Arslanalp et al., 2023)
- We intend to explore how policy uncertainty spillovers (or policy interdependence) across countries are related to gold reserves

## Policy interdependence and gold reserves

- Each country has a unique set of economic, social, and political challenges (inflation and unemployment tradeoffs)
- The domestic policies (monetary or fiscal) are therefore unlikely to be in line with the shared international objectives
- Plaza Accord of 1975; the Louvre Accord of 1985; Financial Stability Board
- Domestic economic policies could result in volatile exchange rate movements, global financial uncertainty and policy spillovers to other countries
- US monetary policy tightening (Asymmetric position as a dominant reserve)
- US and EU sanctions on Russia and the nationalistic macroeconomic policies

Cont....

- Given the historical relevance and the properties of gold as a safe asset with no one's liability, we **hypothesize** that the gold reserves are also related to policy uncertainty spillovers across countries
- G7 countries
- Following the existing literature- USD movements, US treasury yield, inflation, and market uncertainty (VIX) as additional control variables
- Focus on the US macroeconomic variables


## Data description

- Gold reserves as a percentage of total reserves-WGC, USD index, VIX, US CPI, and treasury yields comes from *www.investing.com* and *Fed*
- Monthly economic policy uncertainty (EPU)- *policyuncertainty.com*
- Data range: Q4 2006 to Q4 2022
- The data range accounts for minor banking crises, record-high inflation, monetary policy tightening, Wars, record-high gold reserves demand

# Evolution of gold as a percentage of total reserves vs policy uncertainty spillovers, and other macroeconomic variables

Cont....

Figure 2.





Cont....

## Correlation

	GOLD	CPI	G7	T10Q	T3Q	USD	VIX
GOLD	1						
CPI	0.298	1					
G7	0.332	-0.111	1				
T10Q	-0.412	0.066	-0.276	1			
T3Q	-0.146	0.080	-0.596	0.650	1		
USD	0.132	0.019	0.002	-0.407	0.125	1	
VIX	0.322	-0.223	0.408	-0.007	-0.173	-0.089	1

Table 1

# Methodological Framework

- VAR-based, GFEVD, measures h-step ahead Forecast error variance in variable, say EPU of EU due to a shock in the EPU of US

**Table 2. Overall Connectedness Table**

	$x_1$	$x_2$	...	$x_N$	From
$x_1$	$d_{11}$	$d_{12}$	...	$d_{1N}$	$\sum_{j=1}^N d_{1j}, d_{11} = 0$
$x_2$	$d_{21}$	$d_{22}$	...	$d_{2N}$	$\sum_{j=1}^N d_{2j}, d_{22} = 0$
⋮	⋮	⋮	...	⋮	⋮
$x_N$	$d_{N1}$	$d_{N2}$	...	$d_{NN}$	$\sum_{j=1}^N d_{Nj}, d_{NN} = 0$
To	$\sum_{i=1}^N d_{i1}$ , $d_{11} = 0$	$\sum_{i=1}^N d_{i2}$ , $d_{22} = 0$	...	$\sum_{i=1}^N d_{iN}$ , $d_{NN} = 0$	$\sum_{i,j=1}^N d_{ij}$ , $d_{ij} = 0$ if $i = j$

## DY-12

- Total Spillover Index (G7): sum of non-diagonal elements to total markets (variables) involved.

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i,j=1}^N d_{ij} * 100$$

# Policy uncertainty spillovers across G7




Figure 3

# ARDL

- ▶ ARDL framework for its effectiveness in case of a modest sample size (which in our case is 65), variables being stationary at level or at the first difference and the provision of long-run, short-run and error correction coefficients

$$Gold = F(G7, CPI, T10, T3, USD, VIX)$$

$$Gold = \omega_0 + \omega_1 \ln G7 + \omega_2 CPI + \omega_3 T10 + \omega_4 T3 + \omega_5 \ln USD + \omega_6 \ln VIX$$

- ▶ 
$$\Delta(Gold)_t = b_0 + \sum_{i=1}^l \gamma_1 \Delta(Gold)_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^m \gamma_2 \Delta(\ln G7)_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^n \gamma_3 \Delta(CPI)_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^o \gamma_4 \Delta(T10) + \sum_{i=0}^p \gamma_5 \Delta(T3)_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^q \gamma_6 \Delta(\ln USD)_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^r \gamma_7 \Delta(\ln VIX)_{t-i} + \beta_1 (Gold)_{t-1} + \beta_2 (\ln G7)_{t-1} + \beta_3 (CPI)_{t-1} + \beta_4 (T10)_{t-1} + \beta_5 (T3)_{t-1} + \beta_6 (\ln USD)_{t-1} + \beta_7 (\ln VIX)_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$
- ▶ Variables not I(2)- ADF and PP

## Does co-integration exist?

- ▶ **Null Hypothesis:**  $H_0: \beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta_3 = \beta_4 = \beta_5 = \beta_6 = \beta_7 = 0$ , implying that there is no long-run steady-state equilibrium relationship, against
- ▶ **Alternative Hypothesis:**  $H_A: \beta_1 \neq \beta_2 \neq \beta_3 \neq \beta_4 \neq \beta_6 \neq \beta_7 \neq 0$ , meaning that the long-run relationship exists
- ▶ null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected

F-Bounds Test		Null Hypothesis: No Levels relationship		
		Signif	I(0)	I(1)
Test Statistic	Value	Asymptotic: n=1000		
F-Statistic K	5.2406	10%	1.99	2.94
		5%	2.27	3.28
		2.5%	2.55	3.61
		1%	2.88	3.99

# Empirical results

Table 4. long-run -ARDL

Levels Equation				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
LG7	6.495	1.992	3.260	0.002
CPI	1.671	0.247	6.765	0
T10Q	-1.457	0.208	-6.997	0
T3Q	0.684	0.200	3.413	0.001
LUSD	-4.544	1.572	-2.889	0.006
LVIX	2.339	0.447	5.226	0
C	-0.073	9.259	-0.007	0.993

**Table 5. Short-run -ARDL**

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.*
D(GOLD(-1))	0.410	0.127	3.218	0.0025
D(GOLD(-2))	0.336	0.136	2.458	0.0182
D(GOLD(-3))	-0.378	0.113	-3.338	0.0018
<b>D(LG7)</b>	<b>3.471</b>	<b>1.955</b>	<b>1.775</b>	<b>0.0831</b>
D(LG7(-1))	-3.782	2.647	-1.429	0.1604
D(LG7(-2))	-0.864	2.726	-0.316	0.7529
D(LG7(-3))	5.276	1.675	3.149	0.003
<b>D(CPI)</b>	<b>0.245</b>	<b>0.113</b>	<b>2.169</b>	<b>0.0358</b>
D(CPI(-1))	0.104	0.135	0.773	0.4437
D(CPI(-2))	0.204	0.126	1.616	0.1135
D(CPI(-3))	0.500	0.131	3.800	0.0005
<b>D(T10Q)</b>	<b>-0.920</b>	<b>0.205</b>	<b>-4.470</b>	<b>0.0001</b>
<b>D(T3Q)</b>	<b>0.432</b>	<b>0.141</b>	<b>3.043</b>	<b>0.004</b>
<b>D(LUSD)</b>	<b>-10.061</b>	<b>2.193</b>	<b>-4.587</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>D(LVIX)</b>	<b>0.676</b>	<b>0.257</b>	<b>2.628</b>	<b>0.0119</b>
D(LVIX(-1))	-0.690	0.303	-2.272	0.0282
D(LVIX(-2))	-0.548	0.279	-1.962	0.0564
<b>CointEq(-1)</b>	<b>-0.631</b>	<b>0.090</b>	<b>-6.993</b>	<b>0</b>

## Diagnostic Tests

<b>R-squared</b>	<b>0.639786</b>	<b>Mean dependent var</b>	<b>0.069496</b>
Adjusted R-squared	0.551570	S.D. dependent var	0.685993
S.E. of regression	0.459375	Akaike info criterion	1.466140
Sum squared resid	10.34023	Schwarz criterion	1.912152
Log-likelihood	-32.45033	Hannan-Quinn criter.	1.641255
Durbin-Watson stat	1.883667		
Ramsey Reset Test (specification)		No misspecification (omission and non-linearity)	
Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test		No serial correlation	
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity Test:		Homoskedastic	
CUSUM		Stable	
CUSUM-Square		Stable	





## Limitations and future directions

- ▶ Intended to direct the attention of gold policy researchers and central bank reserve managers on policy uncertainty spillovers across countries and their relationship with gold reserves
- ▶ Implicit assumption that gold is a global asset
- ▶ Domestic factors
- ▶ Exchange rate arrangement-
- ▶ Policy uncertainty spillovers among various groups of countries- (BRICSplus)
- ▶ Asymmetric relationship
- ▶ Similar investigation for dollar reserves
- ▶ Drivers of policy uncertainty spillovers- financial, macroeconomic or geopolitical

## Results and implications

- ▶ This analysis confirmed the importance of various macroeconomic determinants, but highlighted the domination of policy uncertainty spillovers and USD in both the long and short-run.
- ▶ The revelations are important for central banks reserve managers to actively strategize their gold holdings amid rising global policy uncertainty spillovers

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**THANK YOU!**

**Suggestions?**